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ABSTRACT
This paper reviews the inflation experience in the post-Bretton Woods era in the context
of alternative central bank objectives.  It summarizes research on inflation-targeting
issues, especially those associated with stabilizing the price level.  Generally, inflation-
targeting schemes do not provide a nominal anchor unless the central bank is focusing
strictly on the inflation target and ignoring unemployment and the business cycle.
Research summarized in this article suggests that the most important step a central bank
can take to improve policy is to decide on a long-term path for the price level.  Being
explicit about the desired path for the price level not only reduces inflation variability at
all horizons, but also gives the policymaker more flexibility to pursue output stabilization
goals.
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Controlling Inflation after Bretton Woods: An Analysis Based on Policy Objectives
I.  INTRODUCTION
The Czech Republic and other economies in transition are facing the same
problem that Western democracies faced in 1973 when the international monetary system
based on a modified gold standard collapsed.  These countries are now learning how to
develop and maintain an efficient paper money standard, to find a way to anchor the
purchasing power of their currency.  When the Bretton Woods System came apart, the
West went through a long cycle of rising, then falling, inflation.  Was this a one-time
learning experience?  Will the transition economies learn from the mistakes of the United
States and other Western countries?  Have Western countries learned how to prevent such
cycles from recurring?
These are questions without clear answers, despite an abundance of research on
changes in monetary regimes and specific monetary policy rules.  The main problem is
that most of this research does not address the issue of the nominal anchor directly.  This
article summarizes research on the degree of price stability implied by alternative
monetary policy regimes.
The best option for a small open economy like the Czech Republic may be to tie
its monetary policy to a larger trading partner.  Certainly, the idea of fixing the Czech
koruna to the European euro is one possibility.  But exchange rate rules are not
considered here.  Rather, this article examines issues that arise when a country adopts an
independent monetary policy.  Using a common framework, the article compares actual
outcomes to those that might be expected under alternative assumptions about central
bank objectives.2
Section II reviews the inflation experience in the post-Bretton Woods era.
Section III summarizes our research on issues in inflation targeting, especially those
associated with stabilizing the price level.
1  Section IV investigates the improvement in
price stability that can be achieved by adding a long-term price-level objective to an
inflation-targeting regime.  Section V presents results from our model calibrated to time
series data for selected countries and periods.  Section VI concludes.
II.  THE INFLATION EXPERIENCE IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
Since the end of Bretton Woods, most discussion about price stability has been in
terms of inflation, not the price level.  Figure 1a shows the inflation rates for five
countries are key currency countries or had relatively high inflation after March 1973.
As Figure 1a shows, inflation rates were relatively low and close together before Bretton
Woods ended.  By March 1973, all of the countries, except Germany, began to
experience higher and more variable inflation.  While there were a variety of monetary
policy experiments in these countries, all adopted some form of monetary targeting.  Of
these five, only Germany continues to advocate monetary targeting as a framework for
achieving and maintaining price stability.  (Interestingly, Bernanke et al. (1999), who
advocate inflation targeting, list Germany as a country that implicitly targets inflation
even though it announces targets for the monetary aggregate, M3, and has never adopted
short-run targets for inflation.  Also, Clarida and Gertler (1999) describe German policy
more as an inflation-targeting regime than as a monetary targeting policy.)
                                                
1 This article draws heavily on research by Dittmar, Gavin, and Kydland (1999a and 1999b) as well as
work by Dittmar and Gavin (1999).3
Monetary targeting was most prevalent from 1973 through 1985, the period when
inflation was highest and most volatile.  While common behavioral patterns are evident in
Figure 1a, the country detail is not. Figures 1b through 1e show the inflation rates of
Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom and Italy in combination with the inflation
rate for Germany, which had the lowest inflation rate for the full 40-year period.
The countries are ordered by their success in getting control over inflation.
Although Japan and the United States had the same average inflation throughout the 40-
year period, Japan is placed first because Japanese monetary authorities were several
years ahead of the United States in getting control over the inflation.  Initially, Japan
reacted to the quadrupling of the world oil price in 1973 by allowing the inflation rate to
soar above 20 percent per year.  Japanese inflation remained in double digits throughout
1973 and 1974.  By 1977, inflation began to come down.  Since 1980, Japan’s average
inflation rate has been lower than Germany’s (see Figure 1b).
The U.S. government adopted wage and price controls in conjunction with an
expansionary monetary policy in the early 1970s.  In 1973, inflationary pressures
associated with rising world oil prices brought an end to price controls and a rapid
acceleration of inflation (see Figure 1c).  Monetarists in academia and at the St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank argued for stricter monetary targeting—keeping money growth
closer to the target in the short run and achieving the average target growth rate over a
longer horizon (eliminating the year-end drift in the base of the target).  Such stricter
monetary targeting implied less emphasis on keeping output at its full-employment
potential and smoothing short-term interest rates.4
The U.S. Congress passed a resolution in 1975 advising the Federal Reserve to set
targets for monetary and credit aggregates.  In 1978, it passed a law requiring the Federal
Reserve to set annual targets for money and credit.  Although it appeared that the Federal
Reserve had gained control over inflation in 1975-1976, both monetary growth and
inflation surged upward with the 1979 oil price shock.
On October 6, 1979, the Federal Reserve System announced the beginning of a
new resolve to reduce inflation by restricting the growth of the monetary aggregates.
New procedures were adopted that set weekly targets for a monetary reserve aggregate
rather than an interest rate.  The policy led to high and volatile ex post real interest rates,
but no significant decline in monetary growth.  Despite the failure of monetary
aggregates to slow, inflation (as measured by the CPI) fell sharply from a 15 percent
annual rate in the first quarter of 1980 to less than 2 percent in the last quarter of 1982.
The pattern of inflation in the United Kingdom was much the same as in the
United States, but the average rate was somewhat higher (see Figure 1d).  In Italy, the
CPI inflation rate remained in double digits until 1985 (see Figure 1e).  By then, all five
countries appear to have gained more control over inflation.  The period following 1984
appears to be one of relatively stable inflation, more like the period under the Bretton
Woods Agreement.
The unweighted average CPI inflation rate in these five countries for this 40-year
period was 5.4 percent, and the standard deviation of quarterly inflation was 5.1 percent
at an annual rate.  In the period following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods
agreement, average inflation rose to 9.8 percent and the average standard deviation rose
one-half percentage point to 5.6 percent.   Since the end of 1984, the average inflation5
rate has dropped dramatically to 3.3 percent, somewhat below the average during the
period of Bretton Woods.  The average standard deviation of inflation also has been
much lower at 2.6 percent.
The inflation rates shown in Figure 1a were associated with widely varying
behavior of price levels.  Figure 2 shows the Consumer Price Index (CPI), normalized to
one in January 1957, for each of our five countries.  Italy had the highest average
inflation (7.8 percent at an annual rate) throughout the last 40 years, more than 2
percentage points above the average.  The lowest average inflation was in Germany
where the inflation rate averaged 3.2 percent during the full period, more than 2
percentage points below the average.   The broad range of experience in Figure 2 is
shown to provide a benchmark for considering the magnitude of uncertainty about the
price level implied by alternative monetary policy regimes.
III.  INFLATION TARGETING AND PRICE-LEVEL STABILITY
Would a price-level objective destabilize the economy?  The idea of inflation
targeting is appealing both to those who think that having a target for inflation focuses
policymakers’ attention on the inflation objective, as well as to those who want rule-like
policy, but believe that the central bank can still achieve multiple objectives.  The
problem with inflation targeting is that it does not tie down the price level.  It does not
provide a nominal anchor.  If a nominal anchor is the goal, why not target the price level
directly?  Fisher (1994), Cecchetti (1998) and Kiley (1998) offer intuitive explanations—
based on analysis of a single price shock—about why attempting to achieve a price-level
objective would increase the variability of inflation and output.  Milton Friedman (1968)6
made perhaps the most influential objection to price-level targeting in his December 1967
presidential address to the American Economic Association. In recommending how
monetary policy should be conducted, he explains why he would not target a price level:
“Of the three guides listed, the price level is clearly the most important in
its own right.  Other things the same, it would be much the best of the
alternatives—as so many distinguished economists have urged in the past.
But other things are not the same.  The link between the policy actions of
the authority and the price level, while unquestionably present, is more
indirect than the link between the policy actions of the authority and any
of the several monetary totals.  Moreover, monetary action takes a longer
time to affect the price level than to affect the monetary totals and both the
time lag and the magnitude of the effect vary with circumstances.  As a
result, we cannot predict at all accurately just what effect a particular
monetary action will have on the price level and, equally important, just
when it will have that effect.  Attempting to control directly the price level
is therefore likely to make monetary policy itself a source of economic
disturbance because of false stops and starts.  Perhaps, as our
understanding of monetary phenomena advances, the situation will
change.  But at the present state of our understanding, the long way around
seems the surer way to our objective.  Accordingly, I believe that a
monetary total is the best currently available immediate guide or criterion
for monetary policy—and I believe that it matters much less which
particular total is chosen than that one be chosen.”  (Page 15)
This was written before the Rational Expectations revolution had taken hold.  Our
understanding of monetary phenomena has advanced since then.  We now know that the
immediate effect of a monetary policy action on anything will vary with circumstances.
The way to evaluate policy strategies is not to look at the effect of a single action, but
rather to examine the implications of alternative rules in dynamic model economies.
This section summarizes research that uses a dynamic framework popularized by
Lars Svensson (1997, 1999).  Svensson (1999) showed that, for the case with a
Neoclassical aggregate supply function and a persistent output gap, a price-level targeting
regime would result in less short-run inflation variability than an inflation targeting7
regime. Using a simplified version of Svensson’s model, Dittmar et al. (1999a) then
derived inflation-output variability tradeoffs (Taylor Curves) for inflation targeting and
price-level targeting regimes.
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where yt is the deviation of output from the target level (which we assume is the
underlying trend in real output) and (t - 
*) is the deviation of inflation from the central
bank's inflation target.  The central bank discounts future variability in the output gap and
inflation by the factor .  The parameter, , relates the central bank's preference for
output stability to its preference for inflation stability.
The other component is a short-run aggregate supply curve with persistence in the
output gap:
(2) yy tt t t
e
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The introduction of a lagged output gap in this equation is important in comparing
inflation and price-level targeting.  Conceptually, the lag will be introduced any time
some friction prevents instantaneous and complete adjustment of output to unexpected
changes in the price level.  This friction could be induced by incomplete information,
wage contracts, menu costs, transaction costs, incomplete markets, capital adjustment
costs, etc.  Dittmar and Gavin (1999) show that the introduction of lagged output tends to
make the Neoclassical aggregate supply function look more like the New Keynesian
supply functions described in Roberts (1995).8
With this aggregate supply curve and rational expectations, that is, ππ t
e
tt E = − 1 ,
the central bank’s optimization problem implies a tradeoff between output and inflation
variability.
2  Minimizing this loss function—subject to the aggregate supply curve—leads
















where the superscript A indicates that the variable is determined by the inflation-targeting
rule.
3   The inflation rate in each period is set equal to the inflation target, with
countercyclical adjustments proportional to the lagged output gap and the current
technology shock.  Note that this stylized model assumes that the central bank can control
the inflation rate directly.  Thus, we cannot address questions involving the slippage
between changes in central bank instruments and its effect on inflation uncertainty.  The
issue of how a central bank controls inflation is irrelevant in comparing inflation and
price-level targeting.  One step ahead, the control problem is identical.  An appendix in
Svensson (1997) shows that introducing money with a control error in the inflation
equation would not change his results.
4
If the central bank cares about deviations of the price level rather than the
inflation rate, the natural logarithm of the price level, p, will replace the inflation rate in
the loss function.  For price-level targeting, we reformulate the objective function as
                                                
2 Taylor (1979) showed that, in macroeconomic models with Rational Expectations, there was no tradeoff
between the mean growth rate of inflation and the level of output, but there was a tradeoff between the
second moments.
3 See the appendix in Dittmar et al. (1999a) for solution details.  Note that the central bank is assumed to
take expectations as given.  There is no attempt to manipulate the public’s expectations.
4 We could follow the example of Clarida et al. (1999) and use a two-step procedure to derive interest rate
rules.  First, they solve a model like ours for the desired output.  Then, in a second stage, they substitute the
decision rule for output into an IS relation to find the interest rate rule.  We do not think that this would
affect any of our conclusions about the relative desirability of inflation vs. price-level targeting.9
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The target path for the price level may be constant or may be rising at a constant rate.
The superscript B indicates that the loss function is for the case where the central bank
has a price-level objective.
The central bank’s rule for achieving the target path is given by
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The price-level target, pt
*, is given by pt
* = 
*+ pt-1
*.  With the price-level target, the
central bank’s reaction function (6) has three elements on the right-hand side.  The first is
the steady-state inflation embodied in the target path for the price level.  The second and
third are proportional, countercyclical adjustments to the change in the output gap from
period t-2 to period t-1 and the change in the technology shock from period t-1 to period
t, respectively.
As Svensson (1999) explains, the relative variance of inflation under inflation and
price-level targeting rules depends on whether the output gap itself is more or less
variable than its rate of change.  If the output gap is highly persistent ( >0.5), the output
gap itself will be more variable than its rate of change and the inflation rate will be more
variable under an inflation-targeting regime. The answer to the question opening this
section is no, stabilizing the price level should not destabilize short-run inflation or the
real economy.  In the commonly used aggregate supply framework, the price-level target10
actually results in less short-run volatility, not more.  The better performance expected
under price-level targeting can be seen in the Taylor curves for inflation and price-level
targeting in Figure 3.  There we used the Neoclassical aggregate supply function with 
calibrated to persistence in the different countries (always greater than 0.5).  We return to
this figure in Section V.
Kiley (1998) objected to the use of the Neoclassical aggregate supply curve and
suggested that one based on New Keynesian theories would be more realistic and less
likely to favor the price-level target.  Dittmar and Gavin (1999) modified this framework
to incorporate a New Keynesian aggregate supply function.  They derived results
showing that price-level targeting is preferred over inflation targeting in the New
Keynesian case for all values of the central bank’s preference parameter, , and all values
of .
It is important to derive the dynamic properties of economies when comparing
alternative regimes. Our results are derived in model economies with forward-looking
expectations.  This is a critical choice.  Simulations of econometric models typically find
that targeting the price level is a bad idea.  Economists have attributed this result to the
presence of nominal rigidities such as wage contracts or price adjustment costs.  Yet in
these econometric experiments, it is also true that inflation expectations are almost
always backward-looking.  For example, Haldane and Salmon (1995) use a small
econometric model with adaptive inflation expectations to examine whether monetary
policy targets for price stability should be expressed in levels or rates of change.  They
find that price-level targeting results in higher short-run variability for both inflation and11
output growth.  These results are typical of econometric model simulations with
backward-looking expectations.
5
Two notable examples use econometric models modified to include forward-
looking behavior in the financial sectors.  Black, Macklem, and Rose (1997) look at rules
that combine a long-term price-level objective with a short-term inflation-targeting rule.
The presence of an error-correction term guarantees the eventual return of the price level
to its long-run target path.  For values of the error correction parameter between 0.1 and
0.125, they derive a Taylor Curve that is better than with the inflation rule alone.  Using a
policy model estimated at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Williams (1999) finds “interestingly, targeting the price level rather than the inflation rate
generates little additional cost in terms of output and inflation variability. Under price-
level targeting, the expectations channel helps stabilize inflation, thereby eliminating
much of the output stabilization costs that would otherwise be associated with reversing
deviations of the price level from its target.”  Williams confirms the view that price-level
targeting fares so badly in econometric simulations because this is exactly the type of
exercise for which the Lucas Critique is likely to be most relevant.  The policy rules that
were most efficient in reducing inflation and output variability when the model assumes
forward-looking expectations turn out to be the worst when fixed adaptive expectations
are assumed.  And vice-versa, policies that are efficient when expectations are assumed
to be adaptive do poorly when expectations are forward looking.
Does Inflation Targeting Anchor the Price Level?  Adoption of a long-run price-
level objective would probably enhance the short-run stabilization options facing central
                                                
5 See Haldane and Salmon (1995) for further references.12
banks.  But the reality is that central banks are adopting inflation targets, not price-level
targets.  The question that arises is how much slippage of the nominal anchor is allowed
under an inflation-targeting regime—and how much would we have to change current
policies to eliminate some of the slippage?  Dittmar et al. (1999b) address this question
by conducting 40-year experiments using the models presented above.  They find that the
price level and inflation inherently uncertain in current proposals to target inflation.  The
degree of price-level uncertainty depends largely on how aggressively the central bank
tries to stabilize the real economy.
To calculate the price-level uncertainty expected under inflation-targeting
regimes, we ran the model repeatedly under alternative assumptions about the model
parameters.  In the computational experiments,  was set equal to 0.9 and  equal to 0.5.
We assume that the interest rate is 4 percent at an annual rate, so the quarterly discount
factor is approximately 0.99.  The standard deviation of the random error in the aggregate
supply function (2) is assumed to be 0.75 percent at a quarterly rate.  The two most
important parameters in this model are the degree of persistence in the output gap, , and
the central bank’s relative preference for output stabilization, .  The values for  and the
standard deviation of the random error in the aggregate supply function are chosen to
approximate estimates for the U.S. economy.
The experiment is run here using four alternative values of : 0.5, 0.33, 0.25, and
0.1.
 6   The upper panel in Table 1 reports standard errors for deviations of the average
inflation rates from the central bank’s target.  The model was run for 160 periods
(corresponding to quarters).  There were 100 replications in each experiment.  Each13
experiment was started with the same random number seed, so that the same series of
random errors was used in each column of the table.  There were 100 prices saved for
each period.  Trimming 16-2/3 percent off each tail of the distribution of prices in each
period produced the data in the table.  Because the samples were relatively small, the
distributions were not perfectly symmetric.  The standard deviations reported are the
averages of the absolute deviations associated with the upper and lower tails.  The
average inflation rates were calculated from the beginning to the reported horizon.  The
standard deviation of the price level from its expected path for the reported horizons is
shown in the bottom panel of Table 1.
The two most important results are: 1) inflation targeting does not pin down the
price level, and 2) the weight the central bank puts on output stabilization really matters.
With  = 0.5, the standard deviation of the inflation rate is 3.2 percent at a five year
horizon.  If the central bank targets inflation at 2 percent, we would expect the actual
five-year-ahead inflation rate to be greater than 5 percent or less than –1 percent one-third
of the time.   In calculating the inflation risk associated with a 20-year investment, we
would expect the average inflation rate to be greater than 4 percent or less than zero
percent one-third of the time.  If the inflation target were the 40-year average of the five
countries shown in Figure 1, 5.4 percent plus and minus one standard deviation of the
average inflation expected over 40 years nearly includes the 7.75 percent inflation of Italy
and the 3.2 percent inflation in Germany.  The bottom panel shows that with  = 0.33,
there is still an enormous range of uncertainty about the price level at a 40-year horizon
(57.4 percent).
                                                                                                                                                
6 Cecchetti et al. (1999) estimate the value of our preference parameter, , for a number of European14
 McCallum (1997) compares the log of the price level that follows a pure random
walk to a preset target path.  He assumes that the random walk has an unpredictable
component at the quarterly frequency that is approximately equal to the standard
deviation of one-step-ahead forecast errors for the United States throughout 1954-91
(0.0045 percent at a quarterly rate).  With this pure random walk assumption, the 20-
year-ahead price level has a standard deviation of only 4 percent.  Compare this to the 32
percent standard deviation for the 20-year-ahead price level that is implied by the typical
inflation targeting rule when the value of  is as high as 1/3.  Even setting  as low as 0.1
results in three times more uncertainty about the price level than is implied by the
standard deviation in the case of the random walk.  So the answer to the second question
of this section is no, the typical proposal to target inflation does not provide a nominal
anchor.
IV.  MONETARY POLICY WITH A PRICE-LEVEL OBJECTIVE
  Dittmar et al. (1999b) also show that if central banks want to both stabilize
business cycle fluctuations and achieve price stability, they may find it useful to adopt a
long-term objective for the price level.  One way to do this is to follow Black, Macklem,
and Rose (1997) and write down an inflation-targeting rule with an error-correction term
for the deviation of the actual price level from the long-term path implied by the inflation
target.  Another way is to suppose that there is a policymaking committee that includes a
mixture of policymaker types, A and B.  Type A policymaker’s loss function is given by
                                                                                                                                                
countries and conclude that it is often found to be around 0.33.15
L
A and type B policymaker has a loss function, L
B.  The monetary policy rule can be
rewritten approximately as a combination of the two rules:
7
(7)                                                πδ π δ π tt
A
t
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When  = 1, policymakers all want to target inflation and the central bank follows the
rule given in equation 3.  When  = 0, nobody wants to target inflation, and the central
bank follows a price-level rule.  When  falls between 0 and 1, there are policymakers of
both types on the committee and the central bank follows a combination rule that is equal
to the an inflation-targeting rule with an error-correction term on the deviation of the
price level from a target path.  To show this, we substitute equations 3 and 5 into 7 to get
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Equation 8 has the same form as equation 3 except for the addition of the error correction
term.  This general form of the model is used to examine the effects of changing the
relative weight on the alternative rules.
Table 2 presents the results of running the inflation-targeting experiment for our
combination rule.  Here, we assumed the value of 1/3 for the central bank’s preference
parameter, .  The first column of Table 2 merely repeats the second column of Table 1,
where there was no price-level targeting involved.  Here the 20-year-ahead inflation rate
had a standard deviation of 1.6 percent around the target.  Putting just a small, 0.01,
weight on the price-level deviation reduces the standard deviations by 25 percent.
Putting one-tenth of the weight on the price-level deviations reduces the standard
deviations by 75 percent.  As the table shows, even when the error-correction parameter
                                                
7 The exact solution for the combined model is more complicated because people take account of both
objective functions when solving the model.16
is as large as 0.1, the uncertainty about the price level at relevant horizons is still almost
twice as great as McCallum’s random-walk example.
V.  MONETARY POLICY IN SELECTED COUNTRIES
In this section, we compute the Taylor Curves implied by calibrations based on
data from the five countries selected earlier.  The Taylor Curves show a frontier of
minimum combinations of standard deviations for inflation and the output gap that would
be achievable according to our simple model.  We do not look at counterfactual
experiments or examine the expected consequence of the combination policies.  Doing so
would require more rigorous empirical research than is presented here.  The effects of
monetary policy operate through expectations about how policy will be conducted in the
future.  In the best of circumstances, these expectation channels are difficult to identify in
empirical work.  Complicating this task is the evolution of macroeconomic theory and
shifting priorities among policymakers and the general population that occurred during
the post-Bretton Woods period.
Simulations of the model result in a strong and stable relationship between output
and inflation.  In the model, the central bank can control output at short horizons.  This
assumption is probably not true, but is implied by most of the models, both theoretical
and empirical, that are used by central bank economists and their private-sector
counterparts.   Aggregate supply relations are not identified in any of the five countries.
8
In this section, we simply assume that the aggregate supply parameter, , is equal to 0.5.
The value of the coefficient on expected inflation in the velocity function, , is assumed
                                                
8 The macro data on GDP, the monetary aggregates, and the CPI used in this paper were series published by
International Financial Statistics for each of the countries.17
to equal 0.4.  Dittmar and Gavin (2000) show that the results are not sensitive to a
reasonable range of values for  and .  Also, the location of the Taylor Curves for
monetary targeting were relatively insensitive to assumptions about the amount of
persistence in the velocity error.
The output gap was calculated by regressing the logarithm of real GDP for each of
the five countries on a quadratic time trend.  The standard deviations of the output gap and
inflation are reported for each period in the bottom panel of Table 3.  They are also shown
as points in each of the panels of Figure 3, which shows the Taylor Curves for the
individual countries.  The quarterly standard deviation of inflation here is based on the
change in the logarithm of the GDP deflator (Table 1 reports CPI statistics).
The policy model developed above is calibrated to the five countries: Germany,
Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Italy.  We estimate values for the first-
order autocorrelation in the output gap. The equation used to estimate ρ  is given as
 yc y y e tt i t i t
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The properties of the distribution for this estimate were discussed in Dickey and Fuller
(1981).  The equations used to estimate the autocorrelation parameters also yield
estimates of the variance of output shock for each country.  The standard error of the
output shock used in the calibrations is calculated as the standard deviation of the sum of







  This was done because cyclical components
in output are not adequately captured by our simple model.
The post-Bretton Woods period is split in two parts, 1973:Q2 to 1984:Q4 and
1985:Q1 to 1998:Q4.  In the earlier period policy seemed to be more erratic with rising18
inflation in all countries but Germany.  In the latter period, these countries all found a
way to stabilize inflation.  Table 3 shows the estimates of the autoregressive parameters
calculated for the output gap for each period.  The table also reports the statistics used to
calibrate the models that generate the Taylor Curves in Figure 3.
For Germany, only the first-period results are reported because the data available
did not adequately adjust for the effect of the unification on GDP and the monetary
aggregates.  The values used to calibrate the Taylor Curves for Germany (see first panel in
Figure 3) are shown in the first column of Table 3.  The standard deviation of the output
shock was in the low end, equal to Italy’s and somewhat greater than Japan’s, but less than
estimates for the United States and United Kingdom.  However, the estimate of the
persistence in the output gap was the lowest for all countries in either period.  Since we are
using Svensson’s Neoclassical supply function, the relatively low persistence of the output
gap means that the Taylor Curve for price-level targeting is not so far below the one for
inflation targeting.  The location of the actual value of the output variance, 2.3 percent, is
above the highest value suggested by the Taylor Curves generated from inflation-targeting
and price-level targeting regimes.
Japan is a very interesting case because it is the only one in which the Taylor
Curves shift rightward in the second period.  The scales in the panels of Figure 3 are all the
same so that the curves can be more easily compared.  Note, however, that the comparisons
across time for each country are more relevant than the comparisons between countries.
The reason is simply that measurement methods may be so different that cross-country
comparisons are suspect.  In the Japan’s case, the standard deviation of the output shock is19
only slightly lower in the second period, while the persistence of the output gap is much
closer to unity.
In the United States, the standard deviation of the output gap declined by about
two-thirds from the earlier to the latter period.  Although there was a substantial increase in
the persistence, there was still a large downward (leftward) shift in the Taylor Curves in the
second period.  The Taylor Curves for the United Kingdom in the earlier period look
similar to the curves for Japan in the second period.  In the United Kingdom, the standard
deviations of both shocks fell by about half, and there was little change in the
autocorrelation estimate for output.   Italy is an interesting case because it has a relatively
low standard deviation of the shock to the output gap, but has the highest persistence, so the
Taylor Curves are not much different than those for the United Kingdom.  The big leftward
shift in the United Kingdom was associated with a lower error variance, while in Italy, it
was a combination of a lower variance and a lower estimate of the persistence in output.
One common aspect of all of our countries is that the inflation variances are all
smaller in the second period, even in Japan, where the output variance is 50 percent larger
than in the earlier period. In almost every case (the exceptions are Japan and Italy in the
earlier period), the actual values for the standard deviations of the output gap lie above the
maximum value for the standard deviation of output found on the Taylor Curves for
inflation and price-level targeting.  One explanation for this is that the model is too
optimistic about the central bank’s ability to control output.  Perhaps the output variance is
given by nature (or some other aspect of economic policy), and all monetary policymakers
can do is stabilize the inflation rate.  Indeed, some analysts have argued that the main
service provided by explicit inflation targeting is to give central banks the political cover to20
ignore the output gap.  The Taylor Curves shown in Figure 3 were calculated from pure
policies.  In future work, we intend to consider combination policies like those considered
in the previous section.
VI.  CONCLUSION
Our research shows that commonly proposed rules for targeting inflation generate
an enormous amount of uncertainty over the long run.  Inflation-targeting schemes do not
provide a nominal anchor unless the central bank is focusing strictly on the inflation
target and ignoring unemployment and the business cycle.  Inflation has been
unexpectedly stable in the 1990s.  This may be partly because central banks have used
inflation targeting as cover to ignore the real side.  But, with the exception of Japan, it is
also true that output fluctuations in these countries have been smaller in the 1990s than
they were on average for most of the last half century.
The international monetary arrangements agreed to at Bretton Woods in 1946
reflected policymakers’ confidence that they could build a system of fiat money standards
that would provide price stability.  For a variety of reasons, the system failed.   The most
important lesson that the Czech Republic, and all of us, can take from this experience is
to focus on the inflation objective.  Central banks focusing more sharply on inflation
objectives have delivered lower and more stable inflation.
Research summarized in this article suggests that the most important step a central
bank can take to improve focus on the inflation objective is to decide on a long-term path
for the price level.  Being explicit about the desired path for the price level not only
reduces inflation variability at all horizons, but also gives the policymaker more21
flexibility to pursue output stabilization goals.22
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Table 1: Uncertainty about the Price Level and Inflation With Inflation
Targeting
Standard Deviation of Average Inflation Deviation from Target
Years  = .5  = 1/3  = .25  = .1
1 2.1% 1.6% 1.3% 0.6%
2 3.1% 2.4% 1.9% 0.9%
5 3.2% 2.4% 2.0% 0.9%
10 2.7% 2.0% 1.7% 0.8%
20 2.1% 1.6% 1.3% 0.6%
40 1.9% 1.4% 1.2% 0.5%
Standard Deviation of Price-Level Deviation from Target
Years  = .5  = 1/3  = .25  = .1
1 2.1% 1.6% 1.3% 0.6%
2 6.2% 4.8% 3.9% 1.8%
5 16.0% 12.2% 9.9% 4.6%
10 26.6% 20.4% 16.5% 7.7%
20 42.0% 32.2% 26.0% 12.2%
40 74.9% 57.4% 46.5% 21.7%25
Table 2: Uncertainty about the Price Level and Inflation With Inflation
Targeting and a Long-Term Price Objective ( = 1/3)
Standard Deviation of Average Inflation Deviation from Target
Years  = 1  = 0.99  = 0.95  = 0.9
1 1.6% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0%
2 2.4% 1.9% 1.8% 1.6%
5 2.4% 2.2% 1.6% 1.2%
10 2.0% 1.7% 1.1% 0.8%
20 1.6% 1.2% 0.6% 0.4%
40 1.4% 0.8% 0.3% 0.2%
Standard Deviation of Price-Level Deviation from Target
Years  = 1  = 0.99  = 0.95  = 0.9
1 1.6% 1.1% 1.0% 1.0%
2 4.8% 3.9% 3.5% 3.3%
5 12.2% 11.0% 8.2% 6.1%
10 20.4% 17.1% 11.5% 7.9%
20 32.2% 24.8% 12.6% 7.5%
40 57.4% 30.5% 13.1% 8.0%26
Table 3:  Statistics Used in Calibrations of Taylor Curves
Standard Deviations of Inflation (at quarterly rates) and the Output Gap





Output Gap 2.3% 2.0% 2.9% 2.9% 2.3%
Inflation 1.4% 1.3% 0.6% 1.8% 1.1%
1985:1 to 1998:4 1985:1 to 1998:2
Output Gap 3.1% 1.8% 2.7% 1.5%
Inflation 1.0% 0.3% 0.7% 0.5%
First Order Autocorrelations (estimates of )
1973:2 to 1984:4 1976:3 to 1984:4
Output Gap 0.76 0.88 0.81 0.89 0.95
1985:1 to 1998:4 1985:1 to 1998:2
Output Gap 0.94 0.92 0.90 0.87
Standard Deviation of Output and Velocity Shocks (at quarterly rates)




Output Gap 1.47% 1.01% 1.44% 1.36% 0.87%
1985:1 to 1998:4
 1985:1 to 1998:2






















1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
Monthly data, year-over-year growth
Japan











1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
Monthly data, year-over-year growth
Germany









1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
Monthly data, year-over-year growth
Germany








1958 1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1993
Monthly data, year-over-year growth
Germany


















Indexed to 1 in January 1957Figure 3
Taylor Curves for Selected Countries















































































































































































ActualFigure 3  Continued
Taylor Curves for Selected Countries
 United Kingdom
1973:2 to 1984:4
0
1
2
3
01234
Inflation Standard Deviation
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
D
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
Actual United Kingdom
1985:1 to 1998:4
0
1
2
3
01234
Inflation Standard Deviation
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
D
e
v
i
a
i
t
o
n
Inflation Targeting
Price Level Targeting
Actual
Italy
1976:3 to 1984:4
0
1
2
3
01234
Inflation Standard Deviation
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
D
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
Actual
Italy
1985:1 to 1998:2
0
1
2
3
01234
Inflation Standard Deviation
O
u
t
p
u
t
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
D
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
Inflation Targeting
Price Level Targeting
Actual